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The Integrated Theory of Emotional Behavior Follows a Radically Goal-directed Approach 
The target paper and the commentaries reveal two approaches that each propose a 
different mechanism as the default determinant of (emotional and other) behavior: a stimulus-
driven approach and a goal-directed approach.  I start by reiterating the definitions of the 
stimulus-driven and goal-directed mechanisms. I link the latter to the belief-desire theory of 
intentional action (see Dixon, 2017), and I examine whether both mechanisms should be 
supplemented by a third mechanism, as is suggested by Sennwald, Pool, and Sander (2017). 
After that, I zoom in on several ways in which the two mechanisms can interface. While some 
authors seem to seize these interfaces to argue for a fading of the distinction between both 
mechanisms, I will resist such a fading. After that, I turn to a description of the two 
approaches. I address the various strategies raised to salvage the stimulus-driven approach 
(some already mentioned in the target paper, others newly raised by the commentators), and I 
provide arguments for moving to a radically goal-directed approach. Next, I critically 
examine less radical alternatives (e.g., Eickers, Loaiza, & Prinz, 2017; Parkinson, 2017) that 
reject a stimulus-driven approach but see ways to salvage the existence of basic emotions, 
and/or the existence of the entire set of emotions. I end with a few thoughts on taxonomies of 
emotion theories and ways to elaborate the current one. Several more detailed issues raised by 
commentators are interlaced in the text.   
Two Mechanisms 
The distinction between stimulus-driven and goal-directed mechanisms is borrowed 
from the operant learning literature, where both mechanisms are defined in terms of the 
content of their mediating representations (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). A stimulus-driven 
mechanism is one that is mediated by an association between the representation of stimulus 
features and the representation of a response (an [S-R] link).  The stimulus features can range 
from concrete, perceptual ones (e.g., brightness, loudness) to more abstract, relational ones 
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(e.g., goal in/congruence, threat value). In other words, the word “stimulus” in “stimulus-
driven” also covers the meaning of stimuli. This should settle Barrett’s (2017, p. xx) concern 
that the stimulus-driven mechanism is not neurologically plausible. The representation of the 
response, also called the action tendency, can also range from being more concrete (e.g., 
flight, fight) to more abstract (e.g., safety seeking, defense).  
A goal-directed mechanism, by contrast, is one that is mediated by an assessment of 
the expected utility—or short, the utility—of action options. This assessment is based on the 
interaction between representations of the values and expectancies of the outcomes of the 
action options ([S:R-Ov] links). I embedded the goal-directed mechanism in an action control 
cycle, in which the detection of a discrepancy between a stimulus and a first goal gives the 
impetus for a second goal to reduce the discrepancy. This reduction can be achieved either by 
engaging in some action (i.e., assimilation), by choosing a different first goal (i.e., 
accomodation), or by biasing interpretation of the stimulus (i.e., immunization; Brandtstädter 
& Rothermund, 2002). If the utility of one action option is higher than that of other options 
(other actions, accomodation, or immunization), the corresponding action tendency (i.e., third 
goal) is activated. After the action tendency is manifested in behavior, the outcome of this 
behavior serves as the stimulus input for a new action control cycle. To illustrate, if a 
colleague insults you, which is discrepant with a first goal to be respected at work, then the 
discrepancy between both elements activates the second goal to reduce the discrepancy. This 
may lead to the tendency to engage in one or the other action (e.g., shouting, staring through 
the insulter, joking, or walking away), to accomodate (e.g., give up the goal to be respected at 
work)1, or to immunize (e.g., reinterpreting the insult as a desperate cry for attention), 
depending on the utilities of these options.  
                                                          
1 Note that accomodation can explain shifts in goal priority over time (cf. Parkinson, 2017) 
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The first goal in this cycle provides the value of one action outcome and corresponds 
to what philosophers call a desire. The expectancy corresponds to what philosophers call a 
belief. And the action tendency corresponds to what philosophers call an intention or goal to 
act. This mechanism is conform to the belief-desire theory of intentional action (Bratman, 
1987), as noted by Dixon (2017; see also Heyes & Dickinson, 1990). It may be good to 
emphasize, however, that a very thin notion of beliefs, desires, and intentions is used here. 
They are representations that can have any format (e.g., verbal-like or image-like) and that are 
unconscious by default.  
In response to Russell (2017), I wish to specify that I use the term action tendency in 
the sense of an inclination or directedness, not in the sense of a probabilistic trend (Johansson, 
1992). One way in which a system can be directed towards a behavior is by forming a 
representation of it so that it can precede and cause the behavior. I concur with James’ (1890) 
ideomotor principle that all representations of behavior have dynamic features (which is why I 
equate representations of behavior with action tendencies). This means that they are 
manifested into overt behavior unless they are counteracted by other, stronger, action 
tendencies or by physical boundaries. Physiological activity prepares and supports the 
manifestation of action tendencies in overt behavior, and no additional fiat is needed. 
Contrary to Eickers et al.’s (2017) interpretation, the integrated theory is not a disembodied 
theory and neither are the original theories that went into the integration. Bodily activity is 
present in most episodes, but instead of being organized around vernacular emotions, it is 
organized around specific actions. Running asks for activation of the limbs whether it is part 
of a so-called fear episode or a jogging episode.    
Three mechanisms? 
The dichotomy between stimulus-driven and goal-directed (i.e., in terms of the content 
of representations) should not a priori be stacked onto other dichotomies, such as the 
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dichotomy  between rule-based computation and the activation of associations (i.e., in terms 
of operations), the dichotomy between verbal-like and image-like (i.e., in terms of the format 
of representations), or the dichotomy between automatic and nonautomatic (i.e., in terms of 
operating conditions)2. All these dichotomies can be seen as orthogonal to each other (e.g., 
see de Wit & Dickinson, 2009, for an associative acount of the goal-directed mechanism). In 
addition, rather than arguing that each mechanism is subserved by a separate learning system 
(as Sennwald et al., 2017, seem to do), I listed various routes (not all of them learning 
procedures) that can install the representations in both mechanisms: [S-R] links can be learned 
via a moderate operant conditioning procedure (proper to habits), a mere pairing of stimuli 
and responses, and the formation of implementation intentions, but they can also be innate; 
[S:R-Ov] links can be learned via an extensive operant conditioning procedure, via 
observation, or via instruction, but they can also be computed or inferred online. In sum, my 
model is a dual process model based on a single dichotomy, not a dual systems model in 
which two or more dichotomies are stacked onto each other. Importantly, the dichotomy at 
stake refers to two mechanisms for behavior causation, not to two learning systems. Therefore 
Sennwald et al.’s (2017) proposal to add a Pavlovian learning system to the habitual and goal-
directed learning systems cannot be considered as an elaboration of my dual process model 
strictly speaking. Talk of learning systems suggests that learning procedures map neatly onto 
behavioral effects as well as onto mediating mechanisms for behavior causation. There are 
good reasons to resist such a mapping (De Houwer, 2007). Nevertheless, it is a legitimate 
question to ask whether a Pavlovian learning procedure installs a mechanism for behavior 
causation over and above the stimulus-driven and goal-directed mechanisms listed so far.   
                                                          
2 Behavior caused by a goal-directed mechanism is proximally caused by an action tendency, which is a type of 
goal or intention. Thus, goal-directed behavior is nonautomatic in the sense of intentional, although it can still be 
automatic in the sense of fast, efficient, and unconscious. However, this does not touch on the claim that the 
goal-directed mechanism itself can be automatic in every possible sense.  
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A Pavlovian conditioning procedure, which consists of the pairing of a stimulus (S1) 
that does not initially elicit a response, with a stimulus (S2) that does already elicit a response 
(R2), typically leads to a Pavlovian conditioning effect, in which S1 alone presentations lead 
to a response (R1) that is similar, anticipatory, opponent to, or just different from R2. There is 
no consensus about the mechanism that causes R1. There is fair consensus that a Pavlovian 
conditioning procedure installs a [S1-S2] link, but this link is not by itself sufficient to cause 
R1.  Different mechanisms have been proposed for the transition from the [S1-S2] link to R1, 
depending on the nature of the relation between [S1] and [S2]. This relation can be (a) purely 
referential, in the sense that S1 merely reminds of S2, or (b) predictive, in the sense that S1 
predicts the actual occurrence of S2, which means that the person believes that S2 will 
actually occur. In the referential case, activation is spread from S1 to [S1] on to [S2] and any 
further representations. Depending on whether [S2] is itself implied in a [S2-R2] link or a 
[S2:R2-Ov→R2] link to produce R2, R1 may also be caused by the same link. Brandon, 
Vogel, and Wagner (2003) posit that [S1] activates only a decayed representation of [S2], 
which is not capable of producing a full-blown response and sometimes even produces an 
opponent response. In the predictive case, [S1] activates the belief that S2 will occur ([S2’]), 
which explains why R1 is often anticipatory (i.e., prepares for S2). Here again, depending on 
whether [S2’] is itself implied in a [S2’-R2] link or a [S2’:R2-Ov→R2] link to produce R2, R1 
may also be caused by the same link.  
Most authors agree that R1 is not directly caused by a goal-directed mechanism 
([S1:R1-S2]) because there is no contingency between R1 and S2 (although there may be 
superstituous contingency or even real contingency in the sense that some preparatory 
behavior might increase the positivity of a positive S2 and decrease the negativity of a 
negative S2; Hearst, 1979). It is also clear that R1 is not directly caused by a stimulus-driven 
mechanism ([S1-R1]) because S1 did not elicit R1 prior to its pairing with S2. Yet, 
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Timberlake (2001) suggested that due to the pairing of S1 with S2, S1 comes to act as a 
substitute of an S1* that in natural conditions acts as a signal of S2 and that is itself involved 
in an innate [S1*-R1] link. For instance, a tone may come to substitute the smell of food that 
in natural conditions signals food and that is itself implied in an innate [smell-salivation] link.  
In sum, in all the above-described scenarios, the [S1-S2] link requires a stimulus-driven 
mechanism ([S2-R2] or [S1*-R1]) or a goal-directed mechanism ([S2(’):R2-Ov] or [S1:R1-
S2]) to fill in the part of behavior causation. Thus, it does not seem that Pavlovian 
conditioning effects require a third mechanism for behavior causation.  
Sennwald et al. (2017) further discuss incentive sensitization theory (Berridge & 
Robinson, 2003), a theory developed to explain phenomena observed in addiction that are 
difficult to explain with a goal-directed mechanism. For instance, addicts relapse after having 
been abstinent for a long time, so that their drug use cannot be explained by a desire to avoid 
withdrawal symptoms. Or addicts seek drugs even if the hedonic value of the drugs is 
minimal or even absent. Incentive sensitization theory frames these phenomena as cases of 
wanting without liking: The person engages in behavior (drug intake) to obtain an outcome 
(intoxication), even if the outcome has no positive value. This could be formalized as  
S→[S:R-O]→R, in which O has lost its value v. This could then indeed be called a third 
mechanism for behavior causation. According to an alternative interpretation, however, the 
outcome still has a value, but this value is not hedonic. Otherwise put, participants can have 
multiple goals. Drug intake may initially satisfy multiple goals. If one of those goals is no 
longer satisfied by drug intake, there may still be goals left that are satisfied. It could also be 





There are various ways in which stimulus-driven and goal-directed mechanisms can 
interface (see Moors, Boddez, & De Houwer, in press; Kotabe & Hoffmann, 2015; Wood & 
Rünger, 2016). Nevertheless, it is useful to keep a distinction between both mechanisms, as 
well as between the two approaches that are based on them.  
Interface 1 
A first type of interface comes from the very embedding of the goal-directed 
mechanism in an action control cycle. This is because the first step in the action control 
cycle—the step in which the discrepancy between stimulus and a first goal triggers a second 
goal to reduce the discrepancy—can be seen as a [S-R] link couched on a very high level of 
abstraction. The discrepancy between stimulus and goal corresponds to the stimulus feature 
goal incongruent, and the goal to reduce the discrepancy can be seen as a general tendency to 
something about it (whether that is in the form of an overt act or of the mental acts 
accomodation and immunization). In the goal-directed account, however, this first step is 
followed by a step in which the utilities of various overt action options, accomodation, or 
immunization are weighed. Thus, the goal-directed account goes beyond a higly abstract 
stimulus-driven account.  
Interface 2 
A second type of interface is suggested by the idea that a [S:R-Ov] link, installed via a 
moderate operant conditioning procedure, can transform into a [S-R] link (called a habit) if 
the number of operant conditioning trials is drastically increased (and if other conditions are 
fulfilled, such as the absence of choice; Klossek, Yu, & Dickinson, 2011). Extensive 
presentation of the same outcome after the same response in the presence of the same stimulus 
is supposed to lead to the stamping in of the link between [S] and [R] and an evaporation of 
[Ov] (Adams, 1982).  
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The innate [S-R] connections put forward in evolutionary accounts can be seen as 
further cristallizations of what once were [S:R-Ov] connections to our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors. While these ancestors had to learn that venomous snakes lead to sickness or death 
and that fleeing is a good way to avoid that, today we can rely on [S-R] connections that make 
us flee from snakes without having to process the utility of fleeing ourselves. As [S-R] links 
are insensitive to changes in outcome values and expectancies, however, they may cease to 
produce optimal behavior when organisms enter in a new environment with a new outcome 
structure. Venomous snakes are still harmful in our time, but not when they are behind glass 
in a zoo. In the latter case, fleeing is a waste of energy and may make one look ridiculous. 
Thus, although innate [S-R] links may originally stem from, and hence be justified and made 
intelligble by, prior [S:R-Ov] links, it is good to keep the distinction between both links intact 
and to realize that they are not equally flexible and hence not equally optimal.  
In response to Dixon (2017), I wish to note that the term optimal should not be 
understood in an olympian sense. Optimality is always bounded in the sense that people have 
only limited sources of information at their disposal, and that they have limited motivation 
and capacity to process sources of information that are at their disposal (see Bechtel & 
Richardson, 2010). Nevertheless, I maintain that goal-directed mechanisms are more likely to 
provide optimal solutions because they can take into account more sources of information 
(i.e., both the stimulus and the values and expectancies of outcomes) than stimulus-driven 
ones (i.e., only the stimulus). Recall also that goal-directed mechanisms can survive limits in 
capacity, especially when the goal at stake is important and motivation is high.  
Furthermore, I use the term optimal in a local sense. A goal-directed mechanism 
delivers optimal behavior in light of the short- and long-term outcomes that the person 
includes in her analysis at the time of her decision. This behavior may or may not be 
ultimately optimal. A stimulus-driven mechanism, on the other hand, may provide optimal 
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behavior in the short run, if the outcome structure of the current environment happens to fit 
with the outcome structure of the environment in which the [S-R] link was originally 
established. Again, this behavior may or may not be ultimately optimal. This goes against 
Weidman and Tracy’s (2017) claim that the behavior that is dictated by evolution is 
ultimately optimal. An offended person may behave aggressively because she is driven by an 
innate [offense-aggression] link or because aggression has the highest utility for her at that 
time. But the goal-directed mechanism can also dictate a different behavior. An offended 
person may give a friendly moralizing speech to the offender if this action option figures in 
her action repertoire and if she estimates that the utility of such a speech is higher than that of 
aggression. In this case, the evolutionarily dictated aggressive behavior is neither immediately 
nor ultimately optimal.  
Interface 3 
According to a third type of interface, low-level stimulus-driven mechanisms can be 
embedded in a higher-level goal-directed mechanism. This could be the case in skilled actions 
such as typing, where the overarching goal to type remains active while the concrete 
movements of the fingers on the keys follow a chain of S→[S-R]→R→O=S→[S-R]→R 
connections. Novice typers may need a goal-directed mechanism to produce the correct finger 
movements at first. But as typers become more skilled, the initial [S:R-Ov] links may 
transform into [S-R] links. These [S-R] links can be recruited by the overarching goal to type 
which initiates the typing and remains active throughout. In a similar way, skilled social 
communicators may recruit low-level learned or innate [S-R] links as a means to reach their 
overarching communicative goals. This is consistent with Lee and Anderson’s (2017) 
proposal that expressive behavior can be understood at an “older level of utility” for low-level 
physical movements and a “younger level of utility” for high-level social actions. By calling 
both mechanisms forms of utility, however, the authors conceal that the both types are based 
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on different mechanisms. In sum, despite the various types of interface between stimulus-
driven and goal-directed mechanisms, it is crucial to keep a distinction between both 
mechanisms (because they may produce different behavior in some situations) as well 
between the approaches based on them. It is to the approaches that I now turn.  
Two approaches 
Stimulus-driven Approach 
Affect program theory and discrete and dimensional appraisal theories followa a 
stimulus-driven approach. Such an approach analyses the features of stimuli and ties them to 
action tendencies. In affect program theory, [S-R] links are innate and are neurally 
implemented by affect programs. Each [S-R] link is said to correspond to a particular adaptive 
problem (as appraised) and our hunter-gatherer ancestor’s best-bet behavioral solution. In 
discrete and dimensional appraisal theories, [S-R] connections take the form of fixed links 
between appraisal patterns and action tendencies.  
In affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory, different links between 
appraisals and action tendencies ([S-R]) are also taken as the backbone of different basic 
emotions, with the other components as corollary to these components (e.g., physiological 
responses prepare and support overt behavior, and experience is the conscious reflection of all 
components3). This is not the case for dimensional appraisal theory, which assumes that [S-R] 
links are manifold and do not correspond to or gravitate around basic emotions. Some discrete 
and dimensional appraisal theories hypothesize, for instance, that a goal-incongruent stimulus 
that is easy/difficult to control leads to the tendency to flee/fight, yet only the discrete version 
takes this [S-R] link to be characteristic of fear/anger. In sum, for affect program theory and 
discrete appraisal theory (but not dimensional appraisal theory), evidence in favor of their 
hypothesized [S-R] links is also evidence in favor of the existence of basic emotions.  
                                                          
3 Some theories give a more central role to experience in that they postulate it as a mediator between appraisals 
and action tendencies.  
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When empirical research reveals that evidence for a particular stimulus-driven 
hypothesis is inconsistent, proponents of the stimulus-driven approach take recourse to one or 
more of the following strategies. A first strategy can be called refinement. Researchers refine 
a particular stimulus feature (e.g., control) by drawing sharp distinctions between this feature 
and other, related, features (e.g., power, authority, status) or they split the feature into 
subtypes (e.g., stable vs. situational control, prospective vs. retrospective control) and they 
make different predictions for each of those features or subtypes. This strategy is reminiscent 
of the strategy to salvage basic emotions by presenting each of them as a family with different 
shades.  
A second strategy is to seek moderators. One type of moderators are additional 
stimulus features (e.g., agency, un/expectedness, legitimacy). As research continues to deliver 
inconsistent results, the number of moderating variables is progressively increased and ever 
more complex patterns of stimulus features are required to explain a reasonable chunk of the 
variance. This strategy is reminiscent of the strategy to salvage basic emotions by invoking 
mixed emotions, where additional emotions are seen as moderators. Another type of 
moderators are additional processes such as emotion regulation. All stimulus-driven emotion 
theories argue that their hypothesized [S-R] links can be diluted when individuals succesfully 
employ regulation strategies. Moreover, because the intensity of lab-induced emotions is 
typically low (because of ethical constraints), emotion regulation in the lab is often successful.  
A third strategy to preserve [S-R] links is to argue that these links should be 
understood on a higher level of abstraction (e.g., Parkinson, 2017). When research reveals that 
danger not always leads to fleeing but sometimes also to fighting and freezing, the hypothesis 
gets rephrased as the link between danger and the tendency to seek safety of which fleeing, 
fighting, and freezing are concrete manifestations (Bolles, 1970). This is similar to Eickers et 
al.’s (2017) claim that offense does not lead to the tendency to fight, but rather to a more 
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abstract defense tendency, which can be manifested in both fighting (covering all kinds of 
physical and symbolic forms of aggression) ánd withdrawal. Sznycer et al. (2017) likewise 
reject fixed links between adaptive problems (e.g., threat to survival) and concrete behaviors 
(e.g., flight), but they do argue for a fixed links between adaptive problems (e.g., threat to 
survival) and sets of behaviors (e.g., flight, and if that is not possible, fight). Scarantino’s 
(2014; in press) proposal to postulate affect programs with open-ended inputs and open-ended 
outputs also fits in this third strategy. The [S-R] connection is preserved on a high level of 
abstraction so that variety and flexibility are preserved both regarding the concrete stimuli that 
can trigger the [S-R] link and the concrete behavior that can result from it.  
My reply to this third strategy is as follows. When stimulus-driven hypotheses are 
framed at a very high level of abstraction, they become virtually redundant to the first step in 
the action control cycle that I proposed: the step in which the discrepancy between a stimulus 
and a first goal leads to a second goal to reduce this discrepancy (see first type of interface 
above). Saying that danger leads to the tendency to seek safety comes down to saying that a 
discrepancy between a stimulus and a first goal (in this case safety) leads to the second goal to 
reduce this discrepancy. Stimulus-driven hypotheses framed at this abstract level are fairly 
empty, for most of the explanatory work still remains to be done. If it is true that offense leads 
to an abstract defensive tendency, we still need to find out which factors determine whether 
this abstract tendency will give rise to the concrete tendency to fight or to withdraw. This is 
usually the point where proponents of a stimulus-driven approach allow a goal-directed 
mechanism to step in to take care of planning and regulation (e.g., Scarantino, 2014, in press). 
Ironically then, a stimulus-driven approach that formulates its stimulus-driven mechanism on 
the highest level of abstraction and supplements it with a goal-directed mechanism is nearly 
indistinguishable from a goal-directed approach that embeds the goal-directed mechanism in 
an action control cycle. One difference is that the stimulus-driven approach calls the stimulus-
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driven mechanism “emotional” and the goal-directed mechanism “non-emotional”, whereas 
the goal-directed approach (see below) takes the term emotional to be a descriptive feature 
that is applicable to entire action control cycles.  
The three strategies discussed above can explain deviations from the stimulus-driven 
hypotheses and in this way salvage the stimulus-driven approach, but they do not provide 
positive evidence for this approach. Instead of merely arguing how the stimulus-driven 
approach can accomodate discordance (among appraisals and action tendencies, or among 
other components), proponents of this approach should provide evidence for concordance, at 
least under those conditions under which they do predict it. For instance, they should 
demonstrate concordance when a person has little reason or opportunity to regulate emotional 
components. Demonstrating concordance requires demonstrating that there is less variety 
among instances of the same basic emotion subset than among instances of different basic 
emotion subsets. Importantly, the concordance should pertain to the core components: 
appraisals and action tendencies. It is not sufficient to demonstrate concordance among one of 
the core components and its corrolary components (e.g., among appraisals and felt appraisals, 
or among action tendencies and physiological responses or behavior) or to demonstrate 
concordance among different parts of a single component (e.g., among different parts of the 
experience component, as in the studies by Weidman & Tracy, 2017). Moreover, the methods 
for manipulation and measurement should be designed in such a way that results cannot be 
attributed to the mediation of stereotypic scripts, at least if the [S-R] links are assumed to be 
innate (see below).  
Goal-directed Approach as a Radical Alternative 
The integrated theory described in the target paper is not a mere blend of dimensional 
appraisal theory and Russell’s (2003) constructivist theory, as Eickers et al. (2017) put it. The 
integrated theory goes beyond the original theories in that it shakes off certain assumptions 
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from the original theories and incorporates new ones. Indeed, the integrated theory abandons 
the stimulus-driven approach followed by dimensional appraisal theory and replaces it with a 
radically goal-directed approach. While the stimulus-driven approach seeks to discover the 
stimulus features that determine the nature of the action tendency, a goal-directed approach 
proposes action features (such as values and expectancies) as the proximal causes of action 
tendencies. Here, the tendencies to flee, fight, freeze, give in, or reconcile will most often 
depend on the utilities of these actions in the current environment. Stimulus features can still 
be considered as remote causes, but only to the extent that their effect is mediated by these 
action features.  
The stimulus-driven approach adopts a default-interventionist architecture in which the 
stimulus-driven mechanism is the default and the goal-directed one can intervene under 
special circumstances. The goal-directed approach, by contrast, adopts a parallel-competitive 
architecture in which both stimulus-driven and goal-directed mechanisms operate in parallell, 
but the goal-directed mechanism takes the upper-hand and the stimulus-driven mechanism 
only gets to determine behavior in special cases. It should be clear from the above that, 
contrary to what Eickers et al. (2017, p. xx) write, the integrated theory does not cast the goal-
directed mechanism in a merely regulatory role like the stimulus-driven approach does, but 
rather in a leading role.  
The goal-directed approach is not only more parsimonious (it proposes a limited 
number of explanatory factors such as values and expectancies), it also has more explanatory 
power. The stimulus-driven approach only yields plausible predictions in typical contexts but 
not in atypical contexts. It may indeed be best to flee from a threatening stimulus, when the 
stimulus is a tiger and you risk being eaten, but not when the stimulus is the sound of one’s 
train entering the station and you risk missing it (Russell, 2003). The goal-directed approach, 
on the other hand, yields plausible predictions for any type of stimulus in any context. This is 
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why I expect the goal-directed approach to be more fruitful than the stimulus-driven 
approach. Contextual variation may certainly be the rule rather than the exception, as Barrett 
(2012; 2017) argues, but this variation needs to be explained. And the goal-directed 
mechanism seems particularly suitable for this task. If a dangerous stimulus prompts different 
action tendencies in different contexts (e.g., to flee in a tiger context; to approach in a train 
context), then this might be because different actions have different utilities in both contexts 
(e.g., flight has the highest utility in the tiger context; approach has the highest utility in the 
train context).  
It should be clear from the above that, unlike what Eickers et al. (2017) suggest, the 
integrated theory that I propose does not give a central role to stimulus valence, not even in 
combination with other stimulus features or appraisals (e.g., control, expectedness, agency). I 
have argued that the starting point of an action control cycle is the detection of a discrepancy 
between a stimulus and a goal, which overlaps with the apppraisal of a stimulus as more or 
less goal incongruent. Goal in/congruence has often been connected to negative/positive 
valence by researchers, but the agent need not make this connection. The detection of a 
discrepancy leads to the goal to reduce this discrepancy, but this link need not be mediated by 
a valence assessment. The behavior chosen to achieve discrepancy reduction is not fixed by 
patterns of goal in/congruence or valence and additional appraisals (e.g., control, agency) but 
depends on the utilities of the behaviors in the current context. The value of potential future 
outcomes has a central place in this utility (in addition to the expectancies of the outcomes), 
but this is not the same thing as the valence of the stimuli present.   
Eickers et al. (2017) call on the vast literature that purportedly shows emotion-specific 
influences on behavior (and other processes) that go beyond valence. All theories agree that 
goal in/congruence or valence is not sufficient to understand the variety in behavior. The 
question is whether the variety is best understood by invoking emotions or by invoking other 
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causes such as appraisals, stereotypic scripts, or utility principles. Nelissen, Dijker, and 
Zeelenberg (2007) showed that the induction of fear leads to less prosocial behavior than the 
induction of guilt. Fessler, Pillsworth, and Flamson (2004) showed that the induction of anger 
leads to more risk taking than the induction of disgust. A straigthforward interpretation is that 
the emotion induction procedures in these studies indeed induced different emotions and that 
these in turn produced the different behaviors. Alternative interpretations are that the emotion 
induction procedures induced different appraisals (dimensional appraisal theory), different 
sterotypic scripts (constructivist theory), or different utilities of the behaviors (integrated 
theory), and that these are responsible for the effects. If any of these alternative interpretations 
is correct, explanations in terms of emotions may be approximations at best (Ortony & 
Turner, 1990). Emotions may point in a rather imprecise way to other factors that do the 
actual causal work. If so, it seems more fruitful to replace emotional explanations with 
explanations in terms of these other factors.  
Parkinson (2017, p. XX) writes that my “focus on goal-directed practical action [...] 
tends to marginalize any communicative functions of emotional expression and behavior”. 
Russell (2017) also calls for an extension of the integrated theory that includes the component 
of facial expresions. Facial expressions are a form of behavior, which is why I expect them to 
be under the sway of the same goal-directed mechanisms as other behavior (see also Dewey, 
1894; Fridlund, 1994). A person may frown instead of physically attack if frowning has a 
higher utility for goal satisfaction in the current situation than attacking (e.g., frowning can 
make another person come around without incurring the cost of physical attack). The agendas 
of both persons may align or conflict, which may shape the further course of the interaction. 
The action options that figure in a person’s repertoire and the utilities of these options are to a 
large extent determined by prior contextual learning. Both the narrow social context (e.g., 
work, home) and the broader cultural context (e.g., independent vs. interdependent cultures) 
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co-determine the outcome structure of the environment, and in this way, co-determine the 
utilities of the behavioral options. Behaviors that are condemned in a culture have a high cost 
(in that they may lead to exclusion), and as a result, they will be chosen less frequently than 
behaviors that are rewarded in that culture (Cohen, 2001). Like with other behavior, the goal-
directed approach leaves room for a stimulus-driven influence on facial expressions (see also 
the third interface, above), but this influence should not be overstated (see below).  
Less Radical Alternatives? 
So far, I presented three strategies (refinement, the seeking of moderators, and abstract 
rephrasing) that theorists have turned to in an attempt to salvage the central role of stimulus-
driven mechanisms and the basic emotions that are constituted around these mechanisms. 
Some theorists have turned to still other strategies to salvage basic emotions. Instead of 
insisting that basic emotions are characterized by dedicated mental or neural stimulus-driven 
mechanisms, they propose weaker criteria to individuate basic emotions (see also Ortony & 
Turner, 1990). Most of these strategies boil down to the grounding of basic emotions in only a 
single component of the emotional episode, without assuming any fixed relations with other 
components. For instance, one criterion ties each basic emotion to a specific appraisal ([S]), 
corresponding to a specific adaptive problem, life task, or socially significant event (e.g., 
Solomon, 2002; see Parkinson, 2017). Another criterion ties each basic emotion to a specific 
(more or less abstract) action tendency ([R]; e.g., Frijda & Parrott, 2011; see Parkinson, 
2017). These two criteria are compatible with a goal-directed approach as long as they are not 
glued together (otherwise they become [S-R] links).  
This move raises its own questions. Which life tasks or which action tendencies should 
one select and on what basis? The life tasks (e.g., dealing with danger, offense, loss, success, 
poisoning) and the action tendencies (safety seeking, defense, giving in, broaden and build, 
expel) that are typically cited as the essence of basic emotions (e.g., fear, anger, sadness, 
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happiness, disgust) do not seem to form an exhaustive or principled list. For instance, there 
could be danger of poisoning, and all dangers signal a potential loss. Expulsion could be at the 
service of safety seeking, and so could defense. To solve this problem, theorists could come 
up with more principled lists in which life tasks correspond to specific fundamental goals (see 
McDougall, 1923), or alternatively to specific junctures between stimuli and goals (see Oatley 
& Johnson-Laird, 1987). The first approach is domain-specific (with domains standing for 
goals); the second approach is domain-general (the junctures make abstraction of the type of 
goal involved). Theorists could also come up with a more principled list of action tendencies. 
For instance, four highly abstract tendencies could be distilled from the action control cycle 
that I sketched: the tendencies to assimilate, accomodate, immunize, and be passive. These 
lists may indeed be more principled, but they cannot easily be related to existing lists of basic 
emotions, and in this way, may fail to deliver on their promise.  
Theorists not only argue that dedicated neural or mental mechanisms are unnecessary 
for the grounding of basic emotions, but also that they are unnecessary for safeguarding the 
scientific status of the entire set of emotions. Here again, several strategies have been 
invoked. A first strategy is to argue that there are other criteria to demarcate the set of 
emotions besides mechanisms. An example is appraisal theory’s criterion that stimuli in 
emotional episodes are appraised as more goal relevant than stimuli in non-emotional 
episodes. Barrett’s (2017) remark that every action performed is goal relevant and that 
anything else would be metabolically frivolous does not push this criterion aside. Goal 
relevance is a gradual criterion. Every action may stem from a stimulus that is goal relevant to 
some extent, but some stimuli are more goal relevant than others, and the ones that are more 
goal relevant are seen as more emotional. As I argued in the target paper, however, goal 
relevance is only a descriptive criterion for demarcation; it goes some way in describing how 
laypeople rank episodes from less to more emotional. It does not qualify as a scientific 
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criterion precisely because it does not reflect a mechanism or deep structure. Indeed, stimuli 
that differ in goal relevance do not require different mechanisms, neither for the extraction of 
goal relevance (if there is indeed a goal relevance detector, it should produce all degrees of 
goal relevance), neither for the translation of goal relevance in the other components (which I 
hypothesize to most often happen via a goal-directed mechanism).  
A second strategy spelled out by Eickers et al. (2017), Parkinson (2017), and Barrett 
(2012) is that emotions remain real in our experience as well as in the influence they exert on 
our behavior and social life. If a person categorizes herself as angry, she may act in line with 
this emotion, thereby influencing the way in which others react to her and so on. Perhaps 
these authors want to suggest that even if episodes taken as instances of anger do not share a 
dedicated causal mechanism or deep structure, they may still share a deep consequence.  
I have no doubt that self-ascriptions of emotion can influence behavior, but it remains 
to be seen how deep this influence really is. Second, even if evidence would show that self-
ascriptions of emotion do have a deep influence on behavior, this is not yet evidence that 
emotions have a deep influence on behavior. Rather than arguing that emotions are real in the 
sense of being causally efficacious, it seems more accurate to argue that self-ascriptions of or 
beliefs about emotions are real in this sense. If a person believes she has supernatural powers 
and therefore jumps out of the window, it is her belief that makes her jump, not her 
supernatural powers. Studying how people come to self-ascribe emotions and how this 
influences their behavior may be worth our time as scientists, but it  does not make the set of 
emotions scientific. 
The goal-directed approach proposes the following tentative answers to the two 
questions above. People develop emotion categories through personal experience, 
observational learning, instructions, and via inferences (i.e., derived relational responding, see 
Barnes-Holmes & Hughes, 2013). The instances in these categories share scripts (Barrett, 
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2006; Parkinson, 2017). Scripts may take the form of networks in which nodes stand for 
representations of emotional components as well as other information such as labels and 
norms (as suggested by network theories of emotion; e.g., Bower, 1981). Emotion scripts can 
influence behavior via at least two routes. According to a first, stimulus-driven route, the 
script is activated via one of its nodes, after which activation spreads to the other nodes, 
including a node that stand for an action tendency.4 According to a second, goal-directed 
route, information included in the scripts influences the utility assessment of action options 
that are up for comparison, and in this way influences action selection. For instance, if a 
person frames shouting as an anger response, and the anger script contains the cultural norm 
that anger (like other emotions) is irrational and therefore tolerated to some extent by society, 
this may decrease the cost of shouting, and in this way, increase the likelihood that it is 
selected (Averill, 2012, see Parkinson, 2017). The person may even add an extra hysterical 
touch to her shouting to ensure that others do also frame her behavior as angry and not just as 
cruel. Thus, the frenzied feature that some theorists consider to be unique to emotional 
behavior may not point at a stimulus-driven origin, but may instead stem from a utility 
assessment, which is influenced by the shared cultural belief that emotions have this frenzied 
feature. I conclude that the extra layer mentioned by Parkinson (2017, p. xx) can be 
incorporated in the goal-directed approach, without having to assume that emotions are real in 
a scientific sense.  
Taxonomies of theories 
The target paper represents an attempt to integrate two theories (dimensional appraisal 
theory and Russell’s, 2003, psychological constructivist theory) against the backdrop of two 
other theories that they are skeptical of (affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory). 
The aim was not to present an encompassing taxonomy of emotion theories, but a few steps 
                                                          
4 If the networks include representations of values and expectancies of action outcomes and if these play a causal 
role in the action tendency activated, the route qualifies as goal-directed instead of stimulus-driven.  
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were taken toward building such a taxonomy. Building taxonomies can be done in various 
ways. When only a few theories are being compared, as was the case in the target paper, it is 
useful to use a hierarchical tree structure with categories that branch out into subcategories. 
As the number of to-be-compared theories increases, however, it is often better to switch to a 
multi-axis structure in which various theories occupy values on various axes. A first axis is 
constituted by the explanandum: Some theories focus on behavior, others on emotions or 
emotional episodes. A second axis is constituted by the explanantia: Some theories follow a 
stimulus-driven approach (with stimulus-driven mechanisms as the default and goal-directed 
mechanisms as intervenors), others follow a goal-directed approach (with both mechanisms 
operating in parallel, but the goal-directed mechanism dominating behavior). A third axis is 
constituted by whether emotion theories hold a basic emotions view or not. The second and 
third axes are orthogonal: Basic emotion theories can hold a stimulus-driven approach (e.g., 
affect program theory and some discrete appraisal theories), postulating a mental or neural 
stimulus-driven mechanism as the hard liquor of each basic emotion, but they can also be 
non-comittal to a stimulus-driven approach (e.g., other discrete appraisal theories), taking  
only a single component to ground the identity of each basic emotion. Non-basic emotion 
theories can hold a stimulus-driven approach (e.g., dimensional appraisal theory) or a goal-
directed approach (e.g., the integrated theory).  
The partial taxonomy outlined so far would ideally be elaborated with other theories 
such as network theory (discrete version: Bower, 1981; dimensional version: Lewis, 2005) 
and purely descriptive appraisal theory (Clore & Ortony, 2013, mentioned by Barrett, 2017). 
As suggested above, network theory fits well with a stimulus-driven approach. Purely 
descriptive appraisal theory differs from the two mechanistic versions discussed so far in that 
they see appraisals as features of emotional experiences while they remain silent about the 
mechanisms that produce these experienes. Therefore, descriptive appraisal theory is in 
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principle compatible with discrete and dimensional appraisal theories, but also with the goal-
directed theory defended here. Other theories that would merit more thorough comparison 
with the theories described so far are other versions of psychological constructivist theory 
(Barrett, 2014; Cunningham, Stillman, & Dunfield, 2013), social constructivist theories 
(Averill, 2012; Boiger & Mesquita, 2012; Parkinson, 1995), neoJamesian theories (e.g., Prinz, 
2004; Damasio, 1999), and other belief-desire theories (Reisenzein, 2009). This is on my to-
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